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Sexuality in the Third Reich: Historiography and Research Directions
The sexual policies of the Third Reich have often been described by historians as a
concerted effort to reestablish heterosexual norms and uphold traditional standards of
respectability. One of the major contributors to this school of thought, George Mosse, noted that
most of the policies that manipulated sexuality and the private lives of German citizens “were
based upon the Nazi wish to be dynamic and virile, but also respectable, to attack the bourgeoisie
for their formlessness and hypocrisy while nevertheless maintaining bourgeoisie values. There
was to be no change in manners or morals despite certain attitudes that threatened to undermine
respectability. Once again respectability held fast…”1 To be sure, many policies enacted by the
National Socialists were centered around the creation of families, incentives to have children,
and coercing women out of the workplace. However, many historians in the last couple of
decades have taken up the task of rewriting the history of sexuality in the Third Reich to reflect a
more multidimensional approach. For example, historian Dagmar Herzog has demonstrated that
the sexual policies of National Socialism were representative of a process of ‘incitement and
disavowal.’ The National Socialists combined repressive litigation with incentives to pursue a
fulfilled sex life and incorporate the pursuit of sexual pleasure into their paradigm of health and
purity.
In a similar vein, recent research regarding the approach to same-sex incidents among the
ranks of National Socialists has also demonstrated a more complex understanding of sexuality.
Historian Geoffrey Giles indicates in “The Denial of Homosexuality: Same-Sex Incidents in
Himmler’s SS and Police,” that despite establishing the death penalty for same-sex offenders, the
 eorge Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe,
G
(University of Wisconsin Press, 1985) 180.
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SS courts often granted exceptions to this rule and went to great lengths in order to separate
incorrigible circumstances from isolated incidents. Harry Oosterhuis attributes the discrepancies
between National Socialist policies and their implementation to a self-awareness regarding the
homoerotic stigma attached to their Männerbund and party organizations. The bottom line of
most of these arguments is that the sexual policies of the Third Reich demonstrated the capacity
for ambiguity just as much as ideological conviction.2
Homosexuality was undesirable, but the National Socialists did not define it as a
biological issue. Through an examination of the homoerotic legacies attached to the Nazi
Männerbund and the political and bodily demise of Ernst Röhm, I aim to show how the concept
of homophobia in the Third Reich was not simply based on biological degeneracy theories.
Instead, most National Socialists believed homosexuality existed on a spectrum and was the
product of a social disease, but they were unsure of how to identify and categorize certain levels
of this spectrum. An exploration of the deployment of psychiatry and psychotherapy in regards
to the problem of homosexuality among the military substantiates the claims that National
Socialists recognized the complexity of the issue and did not always adhere to the standards of
traditional morality and the polarized view of sexuality explicit in their propaganda. However,
the involvement of the medical community was a flawed approach because the psychiatrists and
psychotherapists could not reach a consensus regarding the genesis of the homosexual problem.
Using a collection of documents submitted by the Reich Ministry of Justice, Secret State Police
Bureau, the Reich Criminal Police Bureau and the Psychiatric Adviser of the Army Medical
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Inspectorate, this analysis explores the disparities in the different approaches to homosexuality
caused by the professional disagreements between psychiatrists and psychotherapists.
Comparing the different approaches taken among the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS outlined in
these documents also shows the limitations of the medical community when working with
organizations responsible for fighting the enemy and protecting the state.
Introduction
During the First World War and the years following, the patriarchal and conservative
fibers tightly woven into the social and political fabric began to unravel. For the first time en
masse, women challenged traditional gender roles by abandoning the domestic sphere for the
workplace. Women demonstrated that the importance of marriage and bearing children had been
eclipsed by the ability to be self-sufficient, independent and acquire the freedom to choose
whether or not they wanted to embody the domestic role put forth for them by conservative
society. In tandem with the liberalization of gender roles, men and women also started to
question the polarized interpretation of their sexuality.

In Weimar Germany, the fight for

sexual rights came to a head in the form of a near successful campaign to repeal the laws of
Paragraph 175. Officially in place in Germany since 1872, the provisions of Paragraph 175
made homosexuality between men illegal with the punishment of imprisonment and the loss of
civil rights. During parliament sessions in 1929, the opponents of Paragraph 175 were able to
obtain a majority vote that would eradicate the blanket criminalization of homosexual acts
between men. However, this victory was short-lived due to the crisis of the Great Depression
and the collapse of Weimar; the legislation was never formally signed into law.

4

Although Weimar was marked by the liberalization of women and campaigns for sexual
freedom, the divisiveness among political factions and the crisis of economic depression initiated
a conservative response among the people of Germany. On the precipice of economic disaster
with ever-deepening rifts between social classes, many Germans were disillusioned with the
liberal democracy that the Weimar Republic represented. When the National Socialists began
campaigning for political dominance in Germany, their message revolved around authority, order
and tradition. One of the ways in which the Nazis were able to achieve dominance was through
their appeal to the security of a patriarchal and heteronormative society.
Within National Socialist ideology, the maintenance of a healthy sexuality was presented
as a matter of life and death. In 1928, the National Socialists responded to the repeal of
Paragraph 175 with the following condemnation:
It is not necessary that you and I live, but it is necessary that the German people live.
And it can only live if it can fight, for life means fighting. And it can only fight if it
maintains its masculinity. It can only maintain its masculinity if it exercises discipline,
especially in matters of love...3
Population regeneration and the reproduction of racially viable stock were cornerstones of
National Socialist ideology, and homosexuality was the antithesis to this mission. However,
despite the vitriolic rhetoric regarding homosexuals and their status in the Third Reich, in
practice the National Socialists demonstrated ambiguity more often than ideological conviction.
In spite of the fact that he was a well-known homosexual, Ernst Röhm climbed the ranks of the
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Nazi party with Hitler’s support before he was murdered during the Night of the Long Knives.
Many historians have also revealed evidence of how the Nazis tolerated certain intimacies and
physical aspects associated with the Männerbund and the process of male-bonding.4 Before the
outbreak of war, the National Socialists tended to quell the homosexual threat among their
organizations using the efficient methods of violence and imprisonment. However, once the war
began and the homoeroticism associated with the male-bonding process increasingly threatened
tight-knit groups of soldiers and SS troops, the National Socialists were willing to adopt an
approach more sensitive to the goals of resource preservation. National Socialist ideology
condemned homosexuality outright, but the unevenness and sporadic implementation of the
regime’s policies betrayed a sense of awareness regarding the complex spectrum of human
sexuality.
Although the National Socialists justified the persecution of the majority of their enemies
using biological racism, homosexuality was not considered an innate condition. Not every
offender exhibited an incorrigible drive and it was a popular view that the problem among the
youth was just a casualty of the process of male-bonding. In order to help identify and
categorize the various levels of homosexual affliction among their own ranks, the National
Socialists relied on the expertise of psychiatrists and psychotherapists. The advice of the
medical community was supposed to provide the Nazis with a more clarity on the subject of
homosexuality, but the psychiatrists and psychotherapists were at odds with each other over the
assessment and diagnosis of the problem. The fundamental disagreement between the two was
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whether homosexuality had a biological component or if it was the result of myriad
psychological factors. The psychiatrists relied on biological factors for most of their theories
regarding the genesis of mental illness, sexual deviancy and other abnormalities, which led to a
preference for the sort of fatalist policies demonstrated by the euthanasia programs. On the other
hand, the psychotherapists believed there were sequences of many different factors other than
biological ones which catalyzed same-sex incidents. In the absence of biological conviction, the
psychotherapists’ emphasized curative methods and believed the vast majority of homosexuals
were capable of reintegration. As a result of this, the approach used to deal with same-sex
incidents in the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS depended on which group, the psychiatrists or
psychotherapists, held the dominant position. However, achieving professional dominance was
further limited by the prior relationships cultivated by the medical community within the
military, the predilections of individuals in leadership positions, and the tendency of military
commanders to prioritize pragmatic decisions over scientific research and exploration.5
I. The Militarized Männerbund of Nazi Germany
After the catastrophic destruction of WWI, both for human life, and to an extent the
dominant political and cultural systems of the 19th century, the National Socialists seized the
opportunity to entice their audience with a chance to begin again. One of the main ways in
which the Nazis chose to initiate their plan for German rejuvenation was to confront the issues of
a depleted population and the degeneration of German society during the interwar period. In
1930, R.W. Darré, one of the leading “blood and soil” ideologists and Minister of Food and
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Agriculture from 1933 to 1942, wrote “thus we are facing the realization that questions of
breeding are not trivial for political thought, but that they have to be at the center of all
considerations, and that their answers must follow from the spiritual, from the ideological
attitude of the people.”6 The reproduction of racially pure German citizens could only occur if
the National Socialists were able to increase the birthrate itself. Women needed to readjust their
aspirations in life to include having as many children as possible in order to coordinate with the
state’s views on population policy. Darré reflected these sentiments when he proposed,
let us return to the custom of our forefathers...let us re-educate our girls to a full
understanding of the old German concept of Züchtigkeit. For our ancestors it was not that
bashful girl who had no knowledge of the facts of her sex who was chaste, but she who
was consciously prepared herself to become a mother and as a mother to rule over a large
amount of children...they did not feel degraded to a “brood-mare,” as is the silly objection
voiced today...instead it was the pride of these women to become the ancestress of a
noble clan and to receive the confirmation of her own value in her noble son…7
It was clear that the new German state aimed to channel the social and political aspirations of
women, which were widely enabled during the Great War and interwar period, into a national
duty to remain at home and bear the future soldiers of the Third Reich.
Although, the National Socialists encouraged marriage and other measures to revitalize
the birth rate, the crux of their new state relied on the idea that men needed to educate and

R.W.Darre, Marriage Laws and the Principles of Breeding, 1930, in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook
ed. by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995),
135.
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strengthen themselves primarily through bonds with other men. Alfred Bäumler, a Nazi political
pedagogue, associated traditional relationships and friendship during the Weimar Republic with
effeminacy and indulgence, and urged German men to prioritize male friendship in order to
ensure the health and strength of the state.8 In an emotional speech, Bäumler cried “there is no
friendship without a fatherland, but no fatherland either without friendship.”9 It was a common
view that the role played by men within the cult of marriage and the family unit inhibited their
intellectual and stately pursuits, whereas engrossment in friendship and communities among men
facilitated the process of social and political self-actualization.10 Friedrich Georg Jünger, brother
to WWI veteran Ernst Jünger, captured the sentiment of many men in post-war society when he
decried that “masculine earnestness is dirtied by empty phrases; everything is befogged by the
dense steam of corruption...universal suffrage is an ingenious sieve working in favor of bustling
agitators and zealous blockheads. The assurance and righteousness with which it repels men of
talent betray the hatred at the root of liberal thinking.”11 As a complement to their scheme for
the service of women in the new regime, the National Socialists endorsed the resumption of a
male-dominated social, sexual and political structure, but not simply through the traditional
authority of the marital and patriarchal unit.
Hitler and many of the other founders of National Socialism were influenced by their
experiences in the Great War and inspired by the relationships forged with their comrades in the
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trenches. For these men, the ideals of friendship, loyalty and bravery exemplified by this
microcosm represented the pinnacle of how state and society should be organized. For this
reason, the groups tasked with the lofty goals of building the male-state and molding the new
German man fell to military institutions like the Wehrmacht and SS. Karl Friedrich Sturm, a
functionary of education and the youth movement claimed,
the Männerbund of the army and of the SA, the SS, and the Labor Service are all
prolongations of the Hitler-Jugend into the years of manhood. Their central educational
task is one and the same. In their ordering and through them is the political German man
to be formed, and indeed above all along the path of practice and habit, with the help of
methodological efforts which promote the frequently repeated act of use of strengths of
body and character, and with emphasis on training for the ability to bear arms.”12
Maintaining the male-state and fostering a militant masculinity were crucial processes to political
and military success. Therefore, the National Socialists perceived anything that might expose
points of vulnerability or weakness in the organizations central to the foundation of the
male-state as a severe threat to the health of the nation.
II. Homoerotic Legacies and the Case of Ernst Röhm
Indeed, the male-state (or Männerbund) that the National Socialists envisioned for the
new Germany was already in a precarious position. The National Socialists used many of the
male organizations and communities popularized during the 19th century as inspiration for their
own militarized Männerbund.

12
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homoeroticism and suspected of creating an atmosphere conducive to homosexuality. Hans
Blüher, a member and one of the first historians of the Männerbund, argued that “homoeroticism
and even explicit homosexuality were fundamental and natural features of the youth movement,
and by extension, of the Männerbund” and that the “super-virile homosexual was not abnormal
and was, moreover, an absolute and essential feature of any successful civilization.”13

In

addition, Blüher rejected that the greatest form of love was between man and woman because
“with that there are children; that is something animalistic.”14

Without the emphasis on

reproduction and the distractions associated with children and wives, Blüher argued that “the
greatest form is the sublimated love between man and man. It is only from this that the greatest
things in world history have come about.”15 In publications like Der Eigene, one of the first gay
journals in the world, men contributed their opinions regarding homosexuality, state-building
and the military.

G. P. Pfeiffer, a contributor to Der Eigene, postulated that “war and

camaraderie are inseparable concepts!

War educates to camaraderie, i.e., it releases often

slumbering characteristics of man, the ability for devoted friendship with the comrades of tent
and battle.

It does not seduce to ‘homosexuality,’ but it brings a basic human drive,

physiological friendship, to operation...Only the super-virile superman, whose nature it is to also
possess female characteristics and above all the drive toward physiological friendship...towers so
high above the masses that he creatively brings to light their best qualities…”16 The tension
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created by some of these homoerotic interpretations of the Männerbund reached a breaking point
due to the increasing publicity surrounding a homosexual, elite member of the Nazi party: Ernst
Röhm.
As a decorated war veteran who believed that Germany’s return to greatness depended on
the reinstatement of the Männerbund, Röhm embodied the type of militant masculinity the Nazis
had envisioned for the new German man. However, Röhm also identified as a homosexual. In
private letters to Dr. Karl-Günther Heimsoth, Röhm admitted “I pride myself on being
homosexual...for my part, I am absolutely not unhappy about my inclination, even though it has
brought considerable difficulties from time to time; on the contrary, I am even inwardly proud of
it.”17 Although Röhm was initially supported by Hitler despite rumors and allegations in the
press regarding his sexuality, his personal inclinations had serious repercussions for the National
Socialist male-state. Adolf Brand, founder of the gay journal Der Eigene, argued that, “men
such as Captain Röhm, whose personal interest in the fight that we are leading for the repeal of
§175 was probably first publicly stated in the Münchener Post, are, to our knowledge, no rarity at
all in the National Socialist party. It rather teems there with homosexuals of all kinds.”18 Brand
further described the early attempts to threaten and persecute homosexuals with violence and
death as ironic because “a quite considerable number of National Socialists and likewise an even
greater group of young party comrades, who enthusiastically flock to the born leaders and heroes
of men could today already be carrying their hangman’s rope in their pockets, since they are all

Eleanor Hancock, "Only the Real, the True, the Masculine Held Its Value": Ernst Röhm, Masculinity,
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completely ripe for the hangman.”19 There was some debate even among the harshest critics of
National Socialism regarding the use of Röhm’s sexuality as ammunition against the movement.
In a protest against the persecution of Röhm for his sexual orientation, human-rights advocate
Kurt Tucholsky contended that, “his inclination does nothing to undermine the man...If Goebbels
screeches or Hitler thunders about the moral decay of modern times, then it should be pointed
out that there are obviously homosexuals among the Nazi troops.”20 The support rallied for
Röhm within parts of the gay community and the publicity generated by the Röhm affair in
general began to compromise the heterosexual standards of masculinity promoted by National
Socialism. In 1934, Röhm was one of the main targets during the purge known as the Night of
the Long Knives or Operation Hummingbird. In a speech to the public with reference to the
purge and Röhm’s execution, Hitler commented that “the life which the Chief of Staff and a
certain circle around him began to lead, was intolerable from any National Socialist viewpoint.”
21

The emphasis on homosexuality as the main motivation behind the purge was meant to

counteract the homoerotic stigma attached to the male-dominated traditions and organizations
that were the foundations of National Socialism.
Although Röhm was tolerated for a time within the Nazi party, the official response to
homosexuality was that “anyone who aims at male-male or female-female sex is our enemy. We
reject everything that emasculates our people and puts it at the mercy of its enemies...Today we
are the weaker ones. Let us make sure that we again become the stronger! We can only do that if
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we exercise discipline. We therefore reject any sexual deviation, particularly between man and
man, because it robs us of the last possibility of freeing our people from the slave-chains in
which it is now forced to toil.”22 Especially after the publicity surrounding the Röhm affair, the
presence of same-sex incidents among the ideological elite of the Third Reich deeply troubled
the sensibilities of SS commander Heinrich Himmler.

Himmler believed that the Nazi

Männerbund represented “an excessive masculinization and in this masculinization the seedbed
for homosexuality.”23 In a speech to the SS-Gruppenführers at Bad Tölz in 1937, Himmler
contended, “we are still getting one case of homosexuality a month in the SS…”24 and he
promised that men convicted of these crimes were to be “taken on my orders to a concentration
camp and there shot while attempting to escape.”25 However, despite the hateful and murderous
rhetoric, Himmler and other influential National Socialists were reluctant to condemn every
instance of homoerotic or homosexual behavior as an indication of an innate inclination worthy
of imprisonment or death. This reluctance was propelled by a resentment towards the dominant
theories of the origins of homosexuality put forth by German intellectuals in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries.
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In 1919, Magnus Hirschfeld established the first institute for sexology (Institut für
Sexualwissenschaft), which offered informational and medical services to people regarding their
sexuality. In Sexual Catastrophe (1926) Hirschfeld noted that, “In every living being born of the
union of two sexes, the characteristics of one sex are to be identified to varying degrees
alongside those of the other...It is therefore a fact that homosexuality is an inborn condition, that
is, a matter of constitution. Typical initial symptoms are demonstrable in homosexuals as early
as the seventh and eighth, indeed, even in the third and fourth year of life.”26 The symptoms of
homosexuality were commonly recognized as the appearance of an effeminate nature. Applied
to same-sex incidents among their military ranks, this interpretation complicated the National
Socialist construction of a heteronormative masculinity crucial to military strength and success in
combat. Instead, most National Socialists viewed homosexuality as a social disease, which
threatened the hierarchy and unity of their organizations. In order to reconcile the strict vetting
process for members of the party with the ongoing discoveries of same-sex incidents among their
own ranks, the leaders of the crusade against sexual deviancy emphasized that there was a
distinction between inborn and acquired homosexuality. Himmler and other military leaders
employed the expertise of the medical community to help establish a standardized process for
making these distinctions and to provide a pathway towards reintegration for the men
categorized as redeemable.
III. The Medicalization of the Problem
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The National Socialists dispatched two major factions of the medical community in order
to address the severe threat homosexuality posed to the military and SS: the Society of German
Neurologists and Psychiatrists and the recently established authority of psychotherapists
operating under the Goring Institute. However, these two groups had opposing views regarding
the origins and treatment of homosexuality. The views of psychiatrists tended to correlate with
racial hygienists and hereditary biologists. In the opinion of the psychiatric advisor at the Army
Medical Inspectorate, “any conviction for unnatural sexual practices (even in a drunken stupor)
indicated with a greater or lesser degree of certainty the presence of an unnatural inclination...It
would not occur to an adult male with normal feelings, even when blind drunk, to engage in
unnatural activity.” The psychiatrists based their approach to same-sex incidents on the theory
that the majority of offenders possessed a genetic disposition and could not be cured through
treatment. The views of the psychotherapists relating to the possibility of curative treatment
were more favorable.
Psychotherapists argued that the root of the homosexual problem was psychological in
origin and the men caught in these scandals could be cured and reintegrated into society.27 For
example, the Reich Criminal Police Bureau, which cooperated and worked with the Goring
Institute, claimed that they distinguished,
between environmentally determined and predisposed cases of unnatural sexual practices.
In practice it works in accordance with the following guidelines. One-time misbehavers
are at first placed under supervision. If there are repeated convictions or seduction of
several partners, an order is made for preventative police detention...Major Dr. Göring at

27
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the Reich Ministry for Air Travel is using psychotherapeutic research to attempt the
reintegration of such people into the national community and he has had some good
results.28
Psychotherapists believed most men were not incorrigible and that they were willing to engage
with different therapeutic techniques to treat soldiers.

However, even among the

psychotherapists there was some ambiguity regarding what types of treatment to administer and
the most accurate ways to identify and categorize the problem. In a circular issued by the
German Institute for Psychological Research and Psychotherapy, one of the leading
psychotherapists attached to the organization, Felix Boehm, implored his colleagues to, “kindly
give me more precise details about the treatments you are conducting...in short, everything which
may have struck or especially interested you in your treatments, or which you think may be of
value for a thorough compilation project on this question in our research department.”29
Although the psychotherapists aimed to rehabilitate homosexuals rather than condemn them as
incorrigible, there was no consensus on a preferred method of treatment. The debate between
psychiatrists and psychotherapists (and the disputes within each group) inhibited the formation of
a uniform policy concerning same-sex incidents.
What did these ambiguities mean for the state-sponsored crusade against same-sex
incidents among soldiers? The effect was that the specific goals and interests associated with
respective factions of the military heavily tempered the approach that was used to grapple with
same-sex incidents. The National Socialist state was not a monolithic machine; it was a nation
Dr. Lehmann for the Field Marshal, Head of the Wehrmacht, 12 August 1942, the decision on a plea for
clemency and its consequences. In Gunter Grau, Hidden Holocaust (Taylor and Francis, 1995), 169.
29
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comprised of many different organizations with competing interests and one that tempted those
in leadership positions to seize opportunities to gain overriding power and push certain agendas.
Even though the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe and the SS looked to the authority of the
psychiatrists and psychotherapists in their quest to eradicate homosexuality, the traditions of
these military organizations and the leadership involved muddled the process. In the case of the
Wehrmacht, a prior legacy and an emphasis on pragmatism helped to shape the approach used to
deal with same-sex incidents. For cases in the Luftwaffe and SS, the ambition and personal
predilections of individuals in leadership positions were the influential factors in molding the
response to homosexuality. The tentative research and theories provided by psychiatrists and
psychotherapists combined with the unique character of each organization resulted in an uneven
approach across the board.
IV. Psychiatrists and the Wehrmacht
The psychiatric community in Germany had already cultivated a strong presence within
the military through their involvement in the First World War. Faced with an influx of soldiers
suffering from mental distress and thus unfit to continue to serve in the war, the German army
relied on psychiatrists to provide a standardized method for diagnosing and treating those
afflicted. Due to the worsening war situation, one of the main concerns for the Empire was the
preservation of financial resources and the manpower of the military and industrial sectors. In
1915, leading psychiatrist Robert Gaupp declared, “I hold it for the most important duty of the
neurologist and psychiatrist to protect the Reich from a proliferation of mental invalids and war
pension recipients.”30 In pursuit of this goal, psychiatrists incorporated productivity and work
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into their processes for therapeutic treatment. Although the mental distress inflicted by the war
might have inhibited soldiers from reassuming their duties at the front, the psychiatric
community believed these men could be filtered into other services suited to their mental state.
For example, historian Paul Lerner suggests that, “such work was made possible in some cases
by adding workshops (for carpentry, wickerwork, shoemaking etc.) to the neurosis stations,
where, in contract with Kriegsämter, soldier-patients were paid for producing necessary goods.”
31

In this way, psychiatrists avoided granting pensions and handicaps that would drain economic

and labor resources reserved for the war effort. Other techniques used by military psychiatrists
were also reflective of the urgency for speed and expediency. Many psychiatrists experienced
success with “active treatment,” which focused on the healing ability of the doctor himself
through powers of suggestion and control over the will of the patient. Treatment ranged from
hypnotism to faux operations, but they were all considered ‘miracle methods’ that demonstrated
instant results. With active treatment, psychiatrists were able to hasten the turnover rate of
soldiers recuperating in hospital wards and revisit many of the cases that were previously
categorized as incurable. The legacy of psychiatry during the First World War was marked by a
willingness to coordinate with state and military goals.
The psychiatric community continued the relationship they had cultivated with the
military during the First World War and established their predominance under the tutelage of the
Wehrmacht. Relative to the goals of expediency, efficiency and preservation of resources during
WWI, the approach to same-sex incidents among soldiers followed a similar trajectory in WWII.
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Towards the beginning of the war, Reinhard Heydrich (Head of the Security Police under
Himmler’s jurisdiction) provided a questionnaire to the Army Health Inspectorate in order to
support research efforts “to clarify the nature of homosexuality.” According to the directive,
“the questionnaires should be completed in respect of each newly emerging homosexual
serviceman.”32 A short sample of the 35 descriptive categories include: born out of wedlock,
number of siblings, which number child in the family, criminal record in the family, mental
subnormals in the family, weakly, rentboys, corrupter of youth, habitual homosexual etc. The
Army Health Inspectorate, Med. Colonel Prof. O Wuth, used the questionnaire in his research
and requested further information relating to an alleged 25 ‘corrupters of youth and 42 ‘rentboys’
from the Army Supreme Command. Despite requests from both the Head of Security Police and
the Army Health Inspectorate, the commander in charge refused to supply the information.33
The task to recruit sufficient manpower in order to meet the challenges of war was difficult
enough without additional bureaucratic measures stalling the process. In an objection to these
measures, the army commander complained that “if the lists were to be kept up to date, the
registration would itself mean an extra burden of work for the recruitment agencies, and given
that the recruitment agencies have more important tasks to perform, the end would in no way
square with the labour-time put into it.”34 It was clear that psychiatrists and medical officers
Questionnaire for homosexual servicemen- Instruction from Heydrich to Gestapo Headquarters, 24
December 1937. In Gunter Grau, Hidden Holocaust (Taylor and Francis, 1995), 124.
33
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needed to be more mindful of wartime goals, especially the preservation of manpower and the
minimization of complicated bureaucratic procedures, when they explored different approaches
to identifying and subduing the homosexual problem.
As the need to preserve manpower grew increasingly dire, the Wehrmacht psychiatrists
provided theories and methods more sensitive to these concerns. In 1943, military psychiatrist
Otto Wuth summarized the findings from his data on same-sex incidents with the argument that,
“medically speaking, it must be stressed that homosexuality, like other sexual perversions, does
not have an affect on the military fitness rating, except in the case of acts committed in the state
defined in §51.1 or 51.2, when the fitness rating should take into account the underlying disorder
(e.g. manic depressive psychosis).”35 If soldiers accused of homosexual behavior were still
capable of fighting the enemy, then a large-scale invasive inquest into every individual and
incident was not the most productive method. In light of this argument, the army psychiatrists
devised a more streamlined approach to the categorization of same-sex offenders.

The

Wehrmacht psychiatrists used the following guidelines when confronted with same-sex
incidents: “offenders who have acted out of a predisposition or an acquired and clearly
incorrigible drive; offenders who have strayed on only one occasion, especially if they were
seduced; and offenders in whom a tendency remains a matter of doubt.”36 The frequency with
which the accused committed same-sex transgressions was the main factor in the decision of
whether or not a soldier possessed the ability to serve effectively. Psychiatrists spared valuable
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time and manpower by paring down the equation for proper identification to just a couple of
variables.
Another way the psychiatrists worked in tandem with the goals of the Wehrmacht was
through their influence on the duration of punishment for soldiers identified as habitual
offenders. Psychiatrists stressed the evidence that a homosexual inclination had no bearing on
fitness or the ability to fight and remain loyal in battle, and thus convicted soldiers were able to
cycle back into normal military service rather quickly. Men accused of frequent displays of
homosexual behavior often received light sentences, and most of the time they only served a
fraction of their punishment. For example, Private Paul H,, who already had a record for
homosxual activity in civilian court, was convicted of four violations of Paragraph 175 during
military service and was sentenced to 18 months in a mobile prison unit. However, after only a
few months in the penal unit, the commander deemed that Paul H. “could again be a useable
soldier” and he “lauded the prisoner’s efforts to make up for his failure.”37 After two separate
commanders attested to Paul H.’s military capabilities and willingness to follow orders, the
Wehrmacht decided to grant clemency and cycle Paul H. back into his regular unit. Although
Paul H. clearly had a long history of homosexual transgressions, he served less than half of his
eighteen-month sentence.38
The short duration of penal sentences normalized by army psychiatrists served an
additional pragmatic goal. In the views of the psychiatric community, transferring soldiers from
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the front to a penal unit presented the “danger that soldiers whose position in civilian life carried
no particular obligations would commit a homosexual act against their own nature so as to gain a
discharge following completion of a short sentence.”39 Desertion was a problem compounding
the already serious lack of manpower and resources. As a result, the psychiatrists adjusted their
standards of judgement and punishment in order to diminish the threat homosexuality posed to
the military.
V. Psychotherapists and the Luftwaffe
Although the backbone of the German military was dominated by the psychiatrists, the
psychotherapists were able to establish an authoritative position among the newest sector of the
military- the Luftwaffe. One of the main reasons the psychotherapists were able to achieve this
was because of the familial connection between Luftwaffe commander, Hermann Göring, and
the director of the Göring Institute, Matthias Heinrich Göring. In addition, the Luftwaffe was a
relatively new branch of the military and it did not harbor prior loyalties to the psychiatric
community. Since the psychotherapists disagreed with the psychiatrists regarding the aetiology
and treatment of homosexuality, the approach used to deal with same-sex incidents in the
Luftwaffe differed greatly from the approach used in the Wehrmacht.
In the instructions for Luftwaffe medical officers for the assessment of same-sex
incidents, the psychotherapists advocated for treatment and reintegration for almost every level
of homosexual inclination.

Men born as homosexuals were understood as “essentially

incorrigible in respect of their instinct, but not in respect of their behavior. An attempt must be
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made to teach them self-control and responsibility. Emasculation is in order for behavioral
defectives, recidivists, and individuals without a sense of responsibility.”40

Although the

psychotherapists advocated a hard-line for “individuals without a sense of responsibility,” their
emphasis on the potential of curative treatment meant that they were willing to spend an
enormous amount of time and energy to properly distinguish between responsible and
irresponsible offenders. For men who were viewed as victims of circumstance, the guidelines
instructed that, “those who have become homosexuals should essentially be regarded as curable.
Specialist psychotherapeutic is necessary. In their case, a court sentence has the educative
purpose of making them aware of the necessity of treatment and strengthening their will to
recover. Emasculation is biologically pointless and eugenically questionable for those who are
capable of being cured.”41 Castration, hormonal injections and other quick-fix methods were
dismissed in favor of clinical observation and methods that required a great deal of time and
commitment to the belief in redemption. The guidelines used by the psychiatrists in the
Wehrmacht revealed a more polarized view of the individuals involved in same-sex incidents.
Although men were able to reintegrate back into their ranks more often than not, the Wehrmacht
preferred punishment over reeducation.
The Luftwaffe guidelines established by the psychotherapists aimed to put almost every
aspect of a soldier’s routine and relationships under the microscope. Beginning with the basic
issue of communicating the dangers of homosexuality to soldiers with the correct form of
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language, the guidelines impressed upon army commanders and medical officers that, “things
must be called clearly and simply by their right name, without prudishness and without
sensational flourishes…It must be made clear to them that expressions such as ‘pansy’, ‘homo’
or ‘arsefucker’ are not allowed when speaking of sexual matters. That kind of slang is poisonous
precisely for young soldiers.”42

The specific discourse used by medical professionals for

soldiers’ sexual education was interpreted as a potential factor in the emergence of same-sex
incidents. The guidelines went on to make a number of suggestions, such as “a healthy sense of
shame is just as necessary as a healthy lack of inhibition. Provocative nudity is not a necessary
condition for sport and physical exercise, any more than flirting with ‘sporty’ trousers and shirts.
Care should be taken that styles of dress and undress are plain and practical.”43 Even the various
types of media circulated through the camps were put under pressure not to offend the
sensibilities of soldiers. For example, the psychotherapists warned against theater performances
because, “not only is healthy love life cynically stripped of illusions; but double-entendres with a
homosexual content, spread under the cover of art, enter the soldiers’ stock of anecdotes and
persist even outside the performance hall. There can be no doubt that many a young soldier has
more easily fallen victim to homosexual enticement because it came after a ‘queer cabaret’
performance.”44

Unlike the psychiatrists who tended to have a more fatalistic view of

homosexuality, psychotherapists spent their resources trying to identify and control the plethora
of variables they believed were involved in the equation for human sexuality.
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One of the most striking differences between the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht approach to
homosexuality was the level of toleration and trust for men known to have harbored a same-sex
inclination.

Psychiatrists in the Wehrmacht believed it was unnatural, unacceptable and

disruptive on all accounts for adult men to show interest in homoerotic behavior, let alone the
full blown homosexual experience.

However, psychotherapists in the Luftwaffe included

provisions in their guidelines which absolved soldiers of blame in some same-sex situations, and
instead faulted the commanders and medical officers for the ways in which they organized and
surveyed communal life. The guidelines advised commanders, “it should never be forgotten that
to sleep in close physical companionship is just as difficult for a man with homosexual
tendencies as the corresponding arrangement with a woman is for a man with normal feelings.
In both cases, it would be asking too much to demand complete self-control.

Illusory

homosexuals, and homosexuals who basically don’t want to give in to their instincts, would
inevitably go astray in such a situation…”45 Special measures needed to be taken with men that
might otherwise be able to maintain self-control. The three factor checklist implemented by the
Wehrmacht made no exceptions for special circumstances and did not encourage a personalized
approach to every same-sex incident.
The Luftwaffe psychotherapists realized the work involved in the amount of observation
and instruction necessary to identify the aetiological of same-sex incidents. The guidelines
admitted, “the medical officer must be clear in his own mind that the same behavior should be
assessed in very different ways according to the culprit’s personality...the correct diagnosis is
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often difficult to make… to know all the possibilities is a great step closer to the truth.”46 The
manpower, time and effort it would take to implement these guidelines were in conflict with the
overall goals of the military at this stage in the war. Although the psychotherapists in the
Luftwaffe had been able to practice some of their curative techniques and rehabilitate many
convicted soldiers, things were not going well for the Nazis on either front and the military
needed to use every last resource available. As a result, the reign of psychotherapy in the
Luftwaffe met an abrupt end towards the end of 1944. In response to the guidelines formatted by
the psychotherapists, The Psychiatric Adviser of the Army Medical Inspector remarked, “wider
distribution of the instructions cannot be recommended, since the views set down within them
are very controversial. Among other things, they make use of the insights of depth analysis and
psychotherapy. Besides, attempts are currently under way-starting from psychiatrists in military
district III...to develop a uniform forensic position on homosexuals.”47

Ultimately the

encroachment of the allies on both fronts and the deterioration of Germany’s fighting force
impeded the psychotherapists’ efforts to examine soldiers and conduct their research.
VI. The Goring Institute and the will of Heinrich Himmler
The attitude persecutory attitude towards homosexuality was the most straight-forward
among the elite organization of the SS. The guidelines for confronting the issue of
homosexuality in the SS were as follows:
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In order to keep the SS and Police clean of vermin with homosexual inclinations, the
Führer has resolved by a decree of 15 November 1941 that a member of the SS or Police
who commits sex offences with another man or lets himself be abused for sex offences
shall be punished with death, regardless of his age. In less serious cases penal servitude
or imprisonment of not less than six months may be imposed.48
For the “less serious cases” of same-sex behavior, who would be in charge of identifying the
levels of complicity and the standards by which the court granted an acquittal or allowed the
accused to escape the death penalty? Who would provide the framework to distinguish between
the incorrigible and the acquired? In the case of the SS, there was no dominant player in the
quest for the solution to the homosexual problem- except for Heinrich Himmler. The SS had
associations with various groups in the medical community, including physicians, psychiatrists
and psychotherapists, but every relationship began and ended at the personal behest of the
vigilante SS leader. Himmler’s views on the psychological community were fraught with
contradictions. For example, at the same time that Himmler denounced the psychotherapists as,
“a trade union for pulling people’s souls to pieces,”49 he also commissioned some of its members
for projects connected to the SS, such as the SS-Lebensborn. However, despite his public
hesitancy with respect to the effectiveness of psychiatry and psychotherapy, these two groups
were summoned by the Himmler and the SS for the purposes of conducting research on the
homosexual issue. For example, Dr. Carl Vaernet was employed by the SS to test the efficacy of
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his proposed treatment to cure homosexuality, which involved the implantation of artificial sex
glands.

In another example, Himmler allowed a group of psychotherapists attached to the

Göring Institute to study the sexual disposition of an SS member suspected of homosexual
behavior by having the accused perform sexual intercourse with a prostitute in front of a panel of
experts.50

Although the SS collaborated with different groups for assistance with the

homosexual problem, the brash and impetuous nature of Heinrich Himmler and his anxiety over
the wartime situation limited the involvement of psychiatrists and psychotherapists.
Psychotherapists from the Goring Institute were given the task of assessing SS members
accused of incorrigibility and who had been charged with the death penalty. There were various
occasions where psychotherapists attempted to assert their authority and reverse the death
penalty through the promise of rehabilitation, but Himmler more often than not derailed these
attempts in the interests of wartime expediency. For example, Dr. Brustmann (a psychotherapist
from the Goring Institute) intervened in a case of homosexual conduct that received the death
penalty by insisting the soldier, “was both mentally and physically underdeveloped” and
provided the concurrence of a second opinion that labeled the soldier as “feeble-minded.”51 In
response to Dr. Brustmann’s disagreement with the court ruling, Himmler wrote a letter to Dr.
Brustmann admonishing him for his interference and “forbidding him from contradicting the
verdicts of the SS court in the future.”52 Although Himmler understood the value of the medical
community and its theories relative to some of the major goals for the Nazi state, if their process
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interfered with the overarching goals of the military and overall safety of the state, than
limitations on their authority and influence had to be put into place. Himmler believed that,
“leniency can only apply in those cases in which it is really a question of the seduction of an
unambiguously normal youth...the war is taking away hundreds of thousands of normal people
still in their youth. But that makes it a duty for us not to shy away from the extermination of
abnormal people who are admittedly the victims of seduction but are damaging the troops.”53
The freedoms of the psychological community in their assessment and approach to the
homosexual issue were limited by the death penalty implemented for members of the SS and
through Himmler’s own ambiguity regarding the origins of the homosexual problem and the
merit of the medical community tasked with its regulation.
Conclusion
The National Socialists proved that their views regarding human sexuality were more
complicated than the polarized understanding espoused by their ideology. The commission of
psychiatrists and psychotherapists demonstrated that the Nazis believed homosexuality existed
on a spectrum; the psychiatrists and psychotherapists worked tirelessly to introduce guidelines
that would assist in the assessment of the level of complicity involved in the transgression. Of
course, the efforts of the psychiatrists and psychotherapists were hindered by their own
professional disagreements as well as by the ambitions of individuals in leadership and the
importance of military pragmatism in the throes of battle. In these circumstances, the methods
used to identify and control the homosexual problem depended on many different theories and
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factors, which were further tapered and manipulated by the specific interests and goals of the
separate sections of the military.
When discovering the complexities of sexuality in the Third Reich, most historians have
emphasized how National Socialist policies created a vacuum for exceptions, extenuating
circumstances and a level of tolerance. Although the National Socialists were willing to tolerate
or dismiss certain types of inclinations, their efforts to find clarity in these distinctions provided
just as many avenues for exclusion and harm to soldiers as it did pathways to reintegration and
redemption. The competition among the medical community and the pressures of war constantly
revised and manipulated the approach to homosexuality, which always had the effect of
providing more stipulations for redemption, punishment, imprisonment or death. The number of
soldiers spared by the theory that homosexuality existed on spectrum needs to be countered by
the number of soldiers who were excluded through the Nazis’ attempt to try and format this
spectrum.

Ultimately, just because the National Socialists betrayed a seemingly more

progressive understanding of human sexuality does not mean that they were any less intimidated
by this knowledge and how it might affect the strength of the military. Facing military defeat
and national destruction, the National Socialists were unable to allow anything to weaken their
soldiers and homosexuality was perceived as a dire threat.
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